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UNCERTAINTY FOR PUBLISHERS: LIABILITY FOR
DEFAMATION UNDER NEW YORK LAW -
WEINER v. DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY
I. INTRODUCTION
No matter how many precautions a publisher takes prior to releas-
ing a non-fiction book, there is always the possibility that someone men-
tioned in the book will take offense at the reference and sue for
defamation. Being subject to such a suit is simply a chance publishers
must take. One might assume, however, that the judicial system provides
some sort of checklist for publishers which, if followed, will at least come
close to guaranteeing victory in the event that a defamation suit is
brought. Unfortunately, no foolproof guidelines appear to have been
provided by state courts in this country. The result is that publishers
must continue to take their chances whenever they release a new book.
They can never be completely certain that the preventative measures they
follow will be sufficient to protect them.
In Weiner v. Doubleday & Company,' ("Weiner") the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division ruled in favor of the publisher,
Doubleday, in a defamation action brought by a private individual.2
While the case provides interesting insight into the issues surrounding
allegedly defamatory statements in a non-fiction book, the court did little
to create clear guidelines for other publishers hoping to learn from the
decision.
This casenote summarizes current New York law in the area of def-
amation and applies it to the facts of Weiner. The note concludes that
while the Appellate Division's holding was correct under state law, there
is a need for New York courts to clearly define steps which publishers
can take to protect themselves from defamation actions. Of course, it is
not possible for courts to absolutely guarantee that any given conduct
will work in all cases. It does seem, however, that courts could provide
concrete, objective examples of factors which would be more likely than
not to swing the scales in a publisher's favor.
1. 142 A.D.2d 100, 535 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1988). This casenote will refer the reader only to
cites in the New York Supplement 2d case reporter.
2. Id. 535 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The highly publicized 1978 murder of multimillionaire Franklin
Bradshaw is chronicled by Shana Alexander in her 1985 book, "Nut-
cracker: Money, Madness, Murder: A Family Album." 3 The book ex-
plores in detail the personality and emotional problems of Bradshaw's
daughter, Frances Schreuder, who was convicted for ordering her son to
commit the murder.' Much of the material obtained for the book came
by way of personal interviews with family members and friends of
Schreuder.5
Amid the four hundred and forty-four pages which examine the
events that ultimately led to the murder, two paragraphs mention one of
Schreuder's psychiatrists, Dr. Herman Weiner, the plaintiff in this case.6
Weiner has been intensely disliked by members of the Bradshaw family
since the mid- 1960s, when, during a divorce-related custody battle, Wei-
ner testified as Schreuder's witness that he felt she was a fit mother.7
Several members of the Bradshaw family, on the other hand, were con-
vinced that she was not in fact a fit mother.' The Bradshaw family felt
much animosity toward Weiner because of his testimony, and these same
family members were the source of much of Alexander's material for her
book.9 References to Weiner in the two paragraphs include Bradshaw's
widow characterizing him as "Weenie, the big, fat, ugly Jew."' In addi-
tion, another family member recalls him testifying in the divorce pro-
ceedings while "eccentrically costumed in bright red slacks and a loud
plaid jacket."" Finally, family members allude to the possibility that
Weiner not only overcharged Schreuder for his services but also may
have slept with her. 2
A. Findings of the New York Courts
As a result of the statements about Weiner in the book, Weiner sued
both the author, Alexander, and her publisher, Doubleday, for libel. 3
3. S. ALEXANDER, NUTCRACKER: MONEY, MADNESS, MURDER: A FAMILY ALBUM
(1985).
4. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
5. Id. at 599.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 598-99.
8. Id. at 598.
9. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99.






The Supreme Court, New York County, granted Weiner's motion for
summary judgment, but the Supreme Court, Appellate Division unani-
mously reversed, and instead granted the defendants' summary judgment
motion.'4
The Appellate Division noted the extensive experience of both Alex-
ander and the researcher who helped her with the book,'5 as well as the
careful reviewing of the entire process by Doubleday.16 The Appellate
Division then held that all of the statements were opinions, which do not
constitute libel and are protected by the first amendment.' 7 Moreover,
the court found that the opinions were sufficiently substantiated for
publication. '8
While evidently unnecessary based on the court's reasoning, the
New York test for liability was also applied to determine whether
Doubleday "acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consid-
eration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination or-
dinarily followed by responsible parties."' 9 The Appellate Division
found that based on all the facts of the case, Doubleday had no reason to
question the accuracy of Alexander's material about Weiner.2" In partic-
ular, the suggestion that Frances Schreuder may have slept with her psy-
chiatrist was based on adequate research, and Doubleday requested
substantiation for much of Alexander's material. 2 ' Moreover, through-
out the book there are warnings and disclaimers to the effect that the
perceptions of interviewees should not be considered entirely factual.22
Weiner's claim was dismissed, and his motion for leave to appeal was
granted by the New York Court of Appeals, which ultimately affirmed
the Appellate Division decision.23
14. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
15. Id. at 599.
16. Id. at 601.
17. Id. at 602.
18. Id.
19. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 601, quoting Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38
N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975). The test seems unneces-
sary because since the court found all statements at issue to be protected opinion, an analysis of
Doubleday's conduct was technically irrelevant. See infra notes 32-33 and 53 and accompany-
ing text.
20. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
21. Id. at 601-02.
22. Id. at 602.
23. Weiner v. Doubleday & Co., 74 N.Y.2d 607, 543 N.E.2d 85, 544 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1989).
The Court of Appeals is the highest state court in New York. It affirmed the Appellate Divi-
sion holding based solely on the finding that Doubleday had not acted in a grossly irresponsi-
ble manner. No. 257, slip. op. at 4 (N.Y. Dec. 14, 1989).
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III. DEFAMATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
In order to understand the legal principles at issue between plaintiff
Weiner and defendant Doubleday, an overview of defamation law in the
context of publisher liability may be helpful. Defamation is generally
defined as "an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name,"24
with reputation involving the way others in the community view the
plaintiff.25 Consequently, in order to be defamatory, the statement at
issue must be communicated to some third person.26 If the statement is
one of personal opinion rather than fact, it cannot be defamatory.27 Even
if a statement is defamatory fact, however, a publisher may still escape
liability if its conduct is not culpable. 28 The defendant's conduct in pub-
lishing a defamatory statement is measured against various court-devel-
oped tests, in order to determine whether or not liability should be
imposed.29 It is difficult to predict what the outcome will be of the tests
used by courts to determine both when statements are defamatory and
when defendants are liable. This unpredictability leaves publishers in the
position of not knowing in advance if their preventative steps will protect
them later in the event that a defamation suit is initiated against them.
A. Opinion vs. Fact
Defamation involves a false statement of fact, as opposed to an opin-
ion. 30 The United States Supreme Court has ruled on this issue, reason-
ing that "there is no such thing as a false idea."31 Therefore, in contrast
to factual statements, "[e]xpression of ... an opinion, even in the most
24. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
25. Id.
26. Id. Note that although Shana Alexander was the author of the book, Nutcracker, her
publisher, Doubleday, was also potentially liable for defamation. This does not mean, how-
ever, that Doubleday was vicariously liable for any tortious conduct on the part of Alexander.
Like authors, publishers are simply liable, upon proof of fault of an authorized agent, for
acting culpably under the applicable rules of defamation law. See PROSSER AND KEETON,
supra note 24, § 113, at 810. See also Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d
Cir. 1980) (A publisher is liable for publishing its writer's defamatory statements and also for
republishing defamatory statements made by others).
27. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Assoc. of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Aus-
tin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1973).
28. Karaduman v. Newsday Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531, 539, 416 N.E.2d 557, 560, 435 N.Y.S.2d
556, 559 (1980).
29. See infra notes 53-89 and accompanying text.
30. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977). The term "false" has
been defined as "substantially inaccurate." See, e.g., Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61,
77, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979).
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
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pejorative terms, is protected ... 32 One commentator has suggested
that this means the privilege of publishing pure opinion is absolute.33 In
other words, a publisher remains free from liability when it publishes
pure opinion, even if the statement might otherwise be defamatory.
Since pure opinion is a protected form of speech, the distinction is crucial
from a publisher's viewpoint. "[W]hen a statement is quite unmistakably
opinion rather than fact, the reward will be not only an exemption for
liability for libel but, often, some writing that is caustic, colorful and
perhaps downright provocative.",
34
1. Opinion vs. Fact: The Law in New York
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provides guidelines in
an attempt to clarify the distinction between statements of fact and opin-
ion.35 The Second Circuit test for determining whether a statement is
protected opinion or unprotected fact has several parts. First, "both the
context in which the statements are made and the circumstances sur-
rounding the statements"36 should be considered. In other words, the
overall context of language used in a book can indicate whether an aver-
age reader would interpret it as fact or opinion. The court should there-
fore focus on the "impression" with which the reader is left, based on the
",37work's "style, organization, and tone ....
Second, the court should "look at the language itself to determine if
it is used in a precise, literal manner or in a loose, figurative or hyperbolic
sense." 38 The United States Supreme Court provides an example of this
literal-figurative distinction. In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn.,
Inc. v. Bresler,39 the plaintiff's position during a heated debate with pub-
lic officials was characterized as "blackmail." '  Defendant newspaper
published reports of the debate as well as the characterization. The
Court found that no "ordinary reader" would have interpreted the state-
ment to mean that the plaintiff was being charged with the commission of
32. Old Dominion, 418 U.S. at 284.
33. B. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LITIGATION
114 (1987) [hereinafter B. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY]. "The implication is that even a
showing of malice ... cannot defeat the privilege that pure opinion enjoys."
34. Id. at 107.
35. New York is in the Second Circuit.
36. Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1985).
37. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 651 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 479 U.S.
883 (1986).
38. Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 226.
39. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
40. Greenbelt Cooperative, 398 U.S. at 7.
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a crime.41 On the contrary, the term as used was considered to be merely
"a vigorous epithet used by those who considered [plaintiff's] negotiating
position extremely unreasonable."42 Because the term "blackmail" was
used loosely or figuratively, it was treated by the Court as a statement of
opinion rather than one of fact.43
The third prong in the Second Circuit test requires the court to de-
termine if the statements are "objectively capable of being proved true or
false."'  Whether or not a statement can be proved true or false in effect
determines its status as an opinion, because "[a]n assertion that cannot
be proved false cannot be held libelous."4 Therefore, if a statement is
not capable of being proven true or false, it is likely to be seen as an
opinion rather than a fact.
If the statement appears to be one of opinion, the Second Circuit
requires one last step: The court must determine if the statement "im-
plies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the
opinion."46 An opinion with some basis in disclosed fact will generally
be protected.47 "When [the facts] are true, and when they are stated, the
first amendment shields from liability an opinion that arises from
them."48 Moreover, an opinion which does not carry with it a specific
factual basis is still protected "if it does not imply that it is based on
undisclosed facts." 49 The result will be different, however, if the opinion
is couched in terms which lead the reader to believe that it is somehow
factual. Thus, "[1]iability for libel may attach.., when a negative char-
acterization of a person is coupled with a clear but false implication that
the author is privy to facts about the person that are unknown to the
general reader."5
41. Id at 14.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 13.
44. Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 226.
45. Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 913.
46. Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 226. The Second Circuit test originated with the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
47. Parks v. Steinbrenner, 131 A.D.2d 60, 520 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (1987).
48. Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 556 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 289, 501 N.E.2d 550, 552, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901,
903 (1986). In Steinhilber, the Court of Appeals of New York found defendant's comments
that plaintiff "looks like a million, every year of it," and, "She lacks only three things to get
ahead, talent, ambition, and initiative," were not intended, based on the overall context, to be
understood as opinions based on undisclosed facts. Id. at 293, 501 N.E.2d at 555, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 906.
50. Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 913. See also Steinhilber v. Alphonse, supra note 49, where the
New York Court of Appeals referred to opinions based on undisclosed fact as actionable
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It is difficult for a publisher to be certain of the status of given lan-
guage because the distinction between fact and opinion is often far from
clear. The matter is a question of law for the court to decide,5 and
generally the viewpoint of an "ordinary reader" must be taken in order
to determine if a statement should be viewed as one of fact or one of
opinion.5 2 While courts are supposed to apply an objective, "ordinary
reader" test, outcomes will not necessarily be consistent due to the sub-
jective elements involved in that test. For example, courts may interpret
the perceptions of an "ordinary reader" differently, or have different no-
tions of the import of the language itself. The subjective elements of def-
amation law make it unlikely for a publisher to be absolutely certain in
advance when a defamation claim might arise and how it might be
resolved.
B. The Various Tests Applied for Determining Liability
Assuming a statement at issue is not pure opinion and thus is unpro-
tected, a court must determine if a defendant publisher nevertheless is
not liable because its conduct was not culpable.53 The test applied to a
publisher's conduct will vary from case to case because the law of defa-
mation has evolved into three distinct categories which are identified
both by the status of the plaintiff and by the subject matter of the lan-
guage at issue.54
Plaintiffs who are public figures or officials must show that the de-
fendant printed a knowing or reckless falsehood, the requisite state of
mind being termed "actual malice" by the United States Supreme
Court.55 A private plaintiff suing over language containing public con-
cern content 56 must show some degree of fault, but this showing need not
"1mixed opinions." 68 N.Y.2d at 289, 501 N.E.2d at 553, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 904. "The actiona-
ble element of a 'mixed opinion' is not the false opinion itself - it is the implication that the
speaker knows certain facts, unknown to his audience, which support his opinion and are
detrimental to the person about whom he is speaking." Id. at 290, 501 N.E.2d at 553, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 904.
51. Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 224.
52. Id. citing Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 894 (2d Cir. 1976).
53. Karaduman, 51 N.Y.2d at 539, 416 N.E.2d at 560, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
54. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 24, § 111 (Supp. at 108-09).
55. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The Court has defined
a public plaintiff as one who has "achieved... general fame or notoriety in the community."
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.
56. The United States Supreme Court has defined speech of a public concern as "speech
that matters," such as speech concerning "the legitimacy of the political process." Philadel-
phia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986). However, the term is not limited
to political expression or comment upon public affairs. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 388 (1967), where the Court noted that no distinction should be made between informa-
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necessarily rise to the level of actual malice. Instead, when the plaintiff is
a private individual, each state may determine the requisite showing of
fault for itself." Moreover, in these cases a court will not follow com-
mon law by presuming damage to reputation; the plaintiff must plead
special damages.58 Finally, the common law prevails when a private
plaintiff sues over language which contains no public concern content;
the plaintiff may recover damages even without a showing of actual loss,
and damage to reputation may be presumed.59
1. Public Figure Plaintiffs
The test for cases involving public figure plaintiffs was set out in
1964 by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan' ("New York Times"). The Court held there that public plaintiffs
must prove "that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."' 6  The Court has distinguished the term "malice" used
in its constitutional sense in New York Times from the common law
meaning of the term.62 Common law "hatred" or "personal spite" to-
ward the plaintiff is insufficient to show actual malice in the context of a
defamation suit.63 Actual malice is thus a term of art; in order to be
liable, the defendant must have published a knowing or reckless false-
hood.64 More specifically, "[tjhere must be sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of [the] publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reck-
tion and entertainment when a matter of public interest is involved. In New York, editors are
deemed to have discretion to determine for themselves what comprises legitimate public inter-
est and concern. See, e.g., Gaeta v. New York News Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d 802, 477
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1984). "While not conclusive, '... editorial determination of what is news-
worthy, may be powerful evidence of the hold those subjects have on the public's attention.'"
Id., 62 N.Y.2d at 349, 465 N.E.2d at 805, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 85, quoting Cottom v. Meredith
Corp., 65 A.D.2d 165, 170, 411 N.Y.S.2d 53, 57 (1978) (public content concerns any matters
that are "newsworthy," and not directed only at a limited audience, such as the topics of bus
safety, quality of restaurant food, and the arrest of a private citizen).
57. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
58. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 24, § 111 (Supp. at 108-09). Special, or actual,
damages include, e.g., proof of injury to reputation. See Dalbec v. Gentleman's Companion,
Inc., 828 F.2d 921, 927 (2d Cir. 1987).
59. Id.
60. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). While New York Times dealt specifically with public officials, its
holding was later extended to all public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
164 (1967).
61. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
62. Old Dominion, 418 U.S. at 281.
63. Id.
64. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970).
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less disregard for the truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice."6
As an example, actual malice would be found if an author, who is in a
position to have specific knowledge of true facts, portrays those facts
differently.66
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the actual malice test is
a difficult hurdle for public plaintiffs: It is "an extremely powerful anti-
dote to the inducement to media self-censorship .... [a]nd it exacts a
correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood.
Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected
to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times
test."67 This tougher standard for public figure plaintiffs is based in part
on the assumption that they "must accept certain necessary conse-
quences of ... involvement in public affairs."6 Moreover, public figures
are usually in their positions voluntarily and thus "thrust themselves"
into the public eye.69 They "invite attention and comment," and "the
communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to in-
creased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them."7
2. Private Plaintiffs - Public Content
Herman Weiner was not required to surmount the barrier of the
actual malice test because of the United States Supreme Court decision in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.7" ("Gertz"). In Gertz, the Court held that the
65. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
66. See, e.g., DiLorenzo v. New York News, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 669, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483
(1981) (evidence of a reporter's prior knowledge of facts permits a jury to find that the reporter
was less than candid when he claimed the facts weren't "clear in my mind" at the time the
article was written). See also Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29
(1979), where the court interpreted the New York Times actual malice test as requiring a case
by case consideration of "defendant's attitude toward the truth or falsity of the material pub-
lished." In Bindrim, defendant author was permitted to attend plaintiff's nude marathon
group therapy sessions only after agreeing in writing not to disclose what happened in the
sessions. Defendant later published a book containing a description of sessions similar to those
of plaintiff's. Plaintiff was depicted as using obscene and unprofessional language which he
did not actually use. Held: Defendant acted with actual malice. Since defendant was in a
position to know the truth or falsity of her material, her publication was in reckless disregard
of the truth or with actual knowledge of falsity. Id. at 73.
67. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
68. Id. at 344.
69. Id. at 345.
70. Id.
71. 418 U.S. 323. Gertz put to rest state court interpretation of Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971), in which the plurality proposed that the New York
Times actual malice test be extended to private individuals who claim that they have been
defamed.
1990]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
actual malice test does not automatically apply when the plaintiff is a
private individual.72 Instead, "the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defama-
tory falsehood injurious to a private individual."73 The Gertz court spe-
cifically permitted states to set up a less stringent standard for private
defamation plaintiffs than that required by New York Times. 74
The Court's rationale for Gertz was based on the substantive differ-
ences between the public and private plaintiff75 as well as on the differing
state interest in each instance.76 Writing for the Court, Justice Powell
stated,
[p]ublic officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and
hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private in-
dividuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state
interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.77
The Gertz decision also took into account the fact that state interests
vary, depending upon who the plaintiff is. As opposed to "the limited
state interest present in the context of libel actions brought by public
persons ... the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of
private individuals requires that a different rule" should apply.78
The states are not, however, without ground rules under Gertz. The
common law rule allowing recovery of presumed or punitive damages
may not be applied unless liability is based on a showing of actual mal-
ice.7 9 In short, states may not impose liability without fault.8" Thus,
when a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages is a private individual,
and something less than actual malice is shown, the plaintiff must plead
actual damages.8' Furthermore, if punitive damages are sought, actual
72. 418 U.S. at 347. Because Herman Weiner was found by the Weiner court to be a
private individual, the Gertz test was applied. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
73. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
74. Id. at 348.
75. Id. at 344.
76. Id. at 343.
77. Id. at 344.
78. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
79. Id. at 349. The Court limited the common law doctrine in order to "reconcile state
law with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amend-
ment." Id.
80. Id. at 347.
81. Id. at 349. The requirement of actual or "special" damages compels the plaintiff to
"do more than allege that injury suffered was the natural result of the alleged libel." Special




malice must be shown even by a private plaintiff.82
In a more recent Supreme Court decision, the Court placed an addi-
tional burden on private plaintiffs.8 In addition to the fault requirement
imposed by Gertz, where the statements at issue are "of public concern, a
private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that
the statements at issue are false."'84 Noting that the burden of proof of
falsity could be placed on either the plaintiff's or defendant's side, the
Court explained that "where the scales are in such an uncertain balance
... the Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true
speech."
85
3. Private Plaintiffs - Private Content
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court limited the Gertz holding
to those cases where the language involves matters of public concern.86
The Court noted that "speech . . of purely private concern is of less
First Amendment concern" than is public content material.8 7 The state
interest in protecting a private plaintiff in these cases "adequately sup-
ports awards of presumed and punitive damages - even absent a show-
ing of 'actual malice.' "388
4. Summary of Tests
The Supreme Court provides a summary of the various tests used to
measure a defendant's conduct in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps. 
89
When the speech is of a public concern and the plaintiff is a
public official or public figure, the Constitution clearly requires
the plaintiff to surmount a much higher barrier before recover-
ing damages from a media defendant than is raised by the com-
mon law [i.e., the actual malice test must be applied]. When
the speech is of public concern but the plaintiff is a private fig-
ure . ., the Constitution still supplants the standards of the
common law, but the constitutional requirements are .. less
82. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
83. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 776.
86. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). See
supra note 56 for discussion of public concern content.
87. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759.
88. Id. at 761 (in context of false and grossly misrepresented credit report sent to five of
the credit agency's subscribers).
89. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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forbidding [i.e., as long as they include some fault requirement,
states can create their own tests]. When the speech is of exclu-
sively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure...,
the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any
change in... the common-law landscape [i.e., damages may be
presumed without a showing of actual damages].90
C. The First Amendment
It should be evident that defamation is far from being a clear-cut
area of law. But there is one more factor which makes it even less pre-
dictable. The first amendment plays an important role in defamation
cases because personal expression is implicated. Tension is thus created
between competing interests. On the one hand, "[t]he First Amendment
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters."'" In practice this means that "[b]ecause the threat or actual
imposition of pecuniary liability for alleged defamation may impair the
unfettered exercise of. . . First Amendment freedoms, the Constitution
imposes stringent limitations upon the permissible scope of such liabil-
ity."92 On the other hand, there is the legitimate state interest in com-
pensating individuals harmed by defamatory statements.93
The law of defamation can thus be confusing and unpredictable due
at least in part to the fact that "our traditional notions of freedom of
expression have collided violently with sympathy for the victim .... ,9
The outcome of the balancing of these two interests, which is done on a
case-by-case basis, obviously cannot be predicted in advance by publish-
ers. One commentator has noted that ambiguity in the law such as that
created by subjective balancing of competing interests "provokes litiga-
tion."95 Neither party in a defamation action can be sure in advance
what a court will determine as to the statement's status as fact or opin-
ion, the plaintiff's status as a private or public individual, or the defend-
ant's conduct.
IV. APPLYING NEW YORK LAW TO THE FACTS OF WEINER
A. The Statements as Fact or Opinion
As noted, expressions of pure opinion are protected under the first
90. Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 775.
91. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
92. Greenbelt Cooperative, 398 U.S. at 12.
93. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
94. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 24, § 111, at 772.
95. L. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT 169 (1987).
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amendment and thus cannot be the basis for a defamation claim.96 The
starting point in analyzing Weiner is therefore the determination of
whether the statements involving Herman Weiner in "Nutcracker" are
opinions or factual assertions.
There were essentially four statements concerning Herman Weiner
in "Nutcracker": Bradshaw's widow's reference to him as "Weenie, the
big, fat, ugly Jew"; another family member's reference to his being "ec-
centrically costumed in bright red slacks and a loud plaid jacket"; a ref-
erence by another family member to unusually large bills for psychiatric
services; and suspicions of "hanky panky" between Weiner and Frances
Schreuder since "Frances always slept with her shrinks."97
Under the Second Circuit test, 98 the epithet used by Bradshaw's
widow is a form of protected opinion. Due to its context, it is difficult to
view the phrase, "Weenie, the big, fat, ugly Jew" as a factual characteri-
zation of Weiner. As discussed earlier, the entire Bradshaw family, in-
cluding his widow, were honest about their dislike for Weiner, and the
epithet, albeit lacking in taste, merely expressed this feeling.99 The state-
ment is not intended to be factually specific, but is instead obviously sub-
jective. A term which is "broad, unfocused, [and] wholly subjective [is]
not the kind of factual expression for which the Constitution permits
liability to be imposed."" Moreover, the United States Supreme Court
has labelled epithets as a form of opinion, therefore rendering them pro-
tected under the first amendment.'0 '
The description of Weiner's dress when he testified in court on be-
half of Schreuder is similarly an opinion under the Second Circuit test.
Application of the third prong of that test to the facts of Weiner is espe-
cially appropriate:'0 2 "An assertion that cannot be proved false cannot
be held libellous."' 3 More specifically, it simply is not possible to deter-
96. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. See also Old Dominion, 418 U.S. 264.
97. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
98. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
99. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99. In fact, the two paragraphs which refer to Weiner
appear to be included solely for the purpose of exploring the Bradshaw family's dislike for
Weiner.
100. Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d at 554.
101. See, e.g., Greenbelt Cooperative, 398 U.S. at 14 (characterizing plaintiff's negotiating
position as "blackmail" is a "vigorous epithet" and not defamatory); See also Old Dominion,
418 U.S. at 282-83 (reference to plaintiff as "scab" is "literally and factually true" and thus not
defamatory even when the term is most often used as an insult or epithet).
102. See Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 226. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text regard-
ing the ability to prove a statement either true or false as being determinative of its status as
opinion or fact.
103. Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 913.
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mine whether Weiner's dress was in fact "eccentric" or whether his
jacket was "loud." How his suit looked was a matter of personal taste,
i.e., an opinion.
The text of "Nutcracker" which explains one family member's belief
that Weiner may have been overcharging Frances Schreuder reads as fol-
lows: "Marilyn Reagan remembers the size of one of his bills: Frances
owed her psychiatrist $3,000. 'My understanding was that her problem
was inability facing reality,' says Marilyn. The huge unpaid bill made
her sister think it might be the psychiatrist who had this problem, not his
patient.' '  As with the statements regarding Weiner's dress, the reason-
ableness of his bills was a matter of personal opinion. Further, the use of
metaphors and hyperbole does not turn statements of opinion into
facts."°5 To illustrate, Marilyn Reagan's comment about Weiner's "abil-
ity to face reality" could be translated to mean, "In my opinion, Dr.
Weiner was charging Frances too much."' 0 6 The language used, while
clearly disparaging, was nonetheless a way to express that opinion.
As with the first three references to Weiner, the last reference, which
suggests the possibility that Weiner may have been sleeping with Frances
Schreuder, was found by the Appellate Division also to be a statement of
opinion. '0 7 However, the court did not analyze this particular reference
under the Second Circuit test for determining when statements are opin-
ions, but instead seemed to rely solely on the propriety of Doubleday's
conduct in order to find Doubleday not liable.'0 8
It is not clear under the Second Circuit test that the statement is an
opinion. The statement, "Frances always slept with her shrinks," can
obviously be construed as inferring that she slept with Weiner too. The
comment is arguably one capable of being proven true or false and could
therefore be characterized as one of fact.'0 9 In addition, even if it were
104. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
105. See Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 229. An author's attempts to express opinions through the
use of metaphors and hyperbole are understood by the average reader to be an opinion; the
statements are thus "entitled to the same constitutional protection as a straightforward expres-
sion of opinion would receive." Id.
106. See Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 228. In Mr. Chow, a specific comment in a restaurant
review, "It is impossible to have the basic condiments... on the table," was translated by the
court into, "I found it difficult to get the basic seasonings on my table." Id. The statement
was held to be protected opinion.
107. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 602 ("[W]e find that the disparaging references to the plaintiff
in those paragraphs are presented as pure opinions and not as facts.").
108. Id. at 600-01. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
109. For example, unlike the tastefulness of Weiner's suit, which is clearly a matter of opin-
ion, the statement about possible sexual relations between Weiner and his patient is capable of
objective confirmation. Either Weiner slept with Frances Schreuder or he did not; the issue is
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purely an opinion, it would seem to the average reader to suggest the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. 110
Under the Second Circuit test, therefore, at least the first three refer-
ences to Weiner in the paragraphs at issue are opinions, and as such
could not form the basis for Weiner's defamation suit. Moreover, the
facts underlying the opinions were set forth by Alexander, including the
disclosed animosity felt by family members toward Weiner."' The over-
all context of the passage confirms that the statements were not specific
allegations of fact.112 Finally, there are numerous disclaimers in the
book wherein Alexander warns readers about the biases of her sources. 11
3
On the other hand, the fourth reference, which points to a possible sexual
relationship between Weiner and Schreuder, is not clearly an opinion.
Nevertheless, this fact alone does not make Doubleday automatically lia-
ble, since the propriety of its conduct must also be considered." 4
B. Private Plaintiff - Public Content: The Law in
New York after Gertz
When a statement is not protected as pure opinion, the publisher's
conduct must be scrutinized to determine if there is defamation liability
for the publication.' In Weiner, the Appellate Division specifically
found Herman Weiner to be a private plaintiff." 6 It further found the
book to be "within the sphere of legitimate public concern ... since the
book dealt with the emotional turmoil in the family of a well publicized
murder victim . . . ."" The case therefore falls within the United States
Supreme Court's Gertz decision. 118 As noted earlier, Gertz allows the
not one of personal opinion. See discussion of third prong in the Second Circuit test supra
notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
110. See discussion of the fourth prong in the Second Circuit test supra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
112. The Appellate Division in Weiner noted that rather than attempting to substantiate or
refute all facts surrounding Frances Schreuder's life, the book "endeavored to expose the inter-
necine rivalries and animosities that led to her downfall." 535 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
113. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 602. Alexander introduces the section of the book in which
the statements at issue are found with a disclaimer. She warns that her sources, including
Frances' children, ex-husbands, and ex-servants are "[n]ot the best of sources in any circum-
stances ..... Id. The Appellate Division found that this and numerous other disclaimers
throughout the book "explicitly disclaimed the factual nature" of the perceptions of her
sources. Id.
114. Karaduman, 51 N.Y.2d at 539, 416 N.E.2d at 560, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
115. See infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
116. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
117. Id. citing Karaduman, 51 N.Y.2d at 539, 416 N.E.2d at 560, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 559. See
also supra note 56 for discussion of public concern content.
118. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
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states to determine for themselves what the requisite standard of fault
must be in defamation cases involving private plaintiffs and public con-
tent.1" 9 The issue of Doubleday's conduct is thus governed largely by
state rather than federal law.
The standard which New York courts must follow was set out by
the highest state court in New York in 1975, just one year after Gertz. 120
In Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 121 the Court of Appeals
of New York noted that the United States Supreme Court, "sensing that
the balance between free speech and private reputation had tipped too far
in the direction of free speech," left the states " 'substantial latitude' in
fashioning a remedy based on fault."' 2 2 The New York court further
held that
where the content of the article is arguably within the sphere of
legitimate public concern, which is reasonably related to matter
warranting public exposition, the party defamed may recover;
however, to warrant such recovery he must establish, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a
grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration of the
standards of information gathering and dissemination ordina-
rily followed by responsible parties. 123
This standard of "gross irresponsibility," which has also been called the
qualified privilege of journalists,124 means that a published statement,
even if defamatory and false, cannot lead to liability unless the publisher
is proven by a preponderance of the evidence to have acted in a grossly
negligent manner.' 25
119. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
120. 418 U.S. 323.
121. 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
122. Chapadeau, 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 63-64, citing Gertz,
418 U.S. at 345.
123. Chapadeau, 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
124. Karaduman, 51 N.Y.2d at 537, 416 N.E.2d at 559, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
125. Id. at 539, 416 N.E.2d at 560, 435 N.Y.S. 2d at 559. Recall that Gertz permits states to
set their own standards for liability when publishers print defamatory falsehoods. State re-
sponses to this invitation have varied. For example, some states, including Colorado, Indiana
and California, continue to apply the actual malice standard of New York Times. See, e.g.,
Walker v. The Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Col. 86, 538 P.2d 450, 457, cert. denied, 432
U.S. 1025 (1975); AAFCO Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975); and Rol-
lenhagen v. City of Orange, 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 422-23, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981). Other
states, including Arizona, Massachusetts, Ohio and Illinois, have eased the plaintiff's burden
by requiring only a showing of ordinary negligence. See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.,
114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216, 1222 (1977); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367
Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1975); Embers Supper Club, Inc. v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
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Under New York law, the plaintiff must show that a publisher
"knew or had reason to know that [its] sources were unreliable or subject
to question."'' 26 In addition, gross irresponsibility may be shown by evi-
dence that the publisher's procedures are generally "slipshod or care-
less." '2  In explaining the difference between the actual malice' 28 and
gross irresponsibility standards, the Court of Appeals of New York has
stated that in order to show actual malice, the plaintiff "is required to
demonstrate the subjective state of mind of the defendant .... 29 In
contrast, the court noted that in the case of gross irresponsibility, "this
standard is capable of being met by wholly objective proof, without the
need to resort to an exploration of the defendant's subjective mental state
.... ",30 In short, under New York law, the gross irresponsibility stan-
dard requires only that a publisher use verification methods "reasonably
calculated to produce accurate copy.'
13'
The plaintiff in a New York defamation case will be awarded com-
pensatory damages only by showing proof of injury to reputation or ac-
tual malice on the part of the defendant. 32 In other words, the plaintiff
must normally plead special damages; damage to the plaintiff's reputa-
tion will be inferred or presumed only when the defendant is shown to
have acted with actual malice. 3 3 Finally, New York requires a showing
of actual malice before the plaintiff can collect punitive damages. 134
Regarding state procedural rules, whether or not a defendant has
acted with gross irresponsibility is generally a question for the jury in
New York.'35 The burden of proof is on the plaintiff.' 36 Since normal
discovery procedures are considered sufficient to obtain evidentiary facts
pointing to gross irresponsibility, New York courts require "specific
proof of. . . 'grossly irresponsible' conduct." 31 In Weiner, therefore, the
casting Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 22, 457 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (1984); and Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d
183, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1975).
126. Karaduman, 51 N.Y.2d at 543, 416 N.E.2d at 562, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
127. Id. at 543, 416 N.E.2d at 562, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
128. Recall that this is the showing which must be made by public plaintiffs. See supra
notes 61-66 and accompanying text for discussion of the actual malice standard.
129. Karaduman, 51 N.Y.2d at 544, 416 N.E.2d at 563, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
130. Id. at 545, 416 N.E.2d at 563, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
131. Id. at 549, 416 N.E.2d at 566, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
132. Dalbec v. Gentleman's Companion, Inc., 828 F.2d 921, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1987).
133. Id. at 927.
134. Id. at 928.
135. Hawks v. Record Printing and Publishing Co., 109 A.D.2d 972, 486 N.Y.S.2d 463,
466 (1985).
136. Ortiz v. Valdescastilla, 102 A.D.2d 513, 478 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1984).
137. Karaduman, 51 N.Y.2d at 543-44, 416 N.E.2d at 562, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 562. New
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burden was on Herman Weiner to prove that Doubleday failed to use
reasonable methods of verification when it published "Nutcracker."
1. The Facts of Weiner under New York law
Although the Appellate Division in Weiner specifically found all of
the statements at issue to be opinions, and therefore protected under the
first amendment,138 it also applied the New York gross irresponsibility
rule to Doubleday's conduct. 3 9 As noted earlier, three of the statements
do appear to be pure opinion.'" However, the inference that Weiner
may have been sleeping with Frances Schreuder is not so clearly an ex-
pression of opinion. 14' Assuming that the inference is not protected as
pure opinion, the application of the gross irresponsibility standard to that
reference is necessary because even if the statement is false, Doubleday
would not be liable unless the plaintiff could prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that Doubleday was grossly irresponsible in publishing it. 142
In short, there can be no defamation liability if Doubleday "exercised
reasonable methods to insure accuracy."' 43 Under New York law, Her-
man Weiner thus had the burden of proving that Doubleday acted in a
"grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the stan-
dards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by
responsible parties."'"
Factors negating a charge of grossly irresponsible conduct include
the use of authoritative sources and editing by persons other than the
author.'45 In Weiner, Shana Alexander relied on appropriate sources for
the allegation that Weiner may have been sleeping with Frances
Schreuder.' 46 In addition to Bradshaw family members, the allegation
was made by two close friends of Frances Schreuder, who both noted
that "Frances always slept with her shrinks."' 47 Similar suspicions were
held by family members, who independently recounted them to Alexan-
der and to Alex Dubro, a professional researcher who worked with Alex-
York courts will not "accept bare speculations or inferences... as substitutes for specific proof
of... 'grossly irresponsible' conduct." Id. at 544, 416 N.E.2d at 562, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
138. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
139. Id. at 601.
140. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fourth reference
about Herman Weiner.
142. Karaduman, 51 N.Y.2d at 539, 416 N.E.2d at 560, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
143. Chapadeau, 38 N.Y.2d at 200, 341 N.E.2d at 572, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
144. Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
145. Id. at 200, 341 N.E.2d at 571-72, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 65.




ander on the book.'14  Due to the biases held by the Bradshaw family
against Herman Weiner, the family members would have been inade-
quate as the sole sources for the suspicion. It was thus the independent
corroboration from friends outside the family which lent credence to the
suspicion. In light of these independent reports, Doubleday had "no rea-
son to doubt the accuracy of the statement as published" that "hanky
panky" between Weiner and Schreuder was suspected. 4 9
Other factors in the case also tend to show that Doubleday did not
act in a grossly irresponsible manner. The Appellate Division in a previ-
ous case identified factors which serve as guidelines for determining gross
irresponsibility. 50 A court should look at whether:
sound journalistic practices were followed in preparing the de-
famatory article..., whether normal procedures were followed
and whether an editor reviewed the copy . . ., whether there
was any reason to doubt the accuracy of the source relied upon
so as to produce a duty to make further inquiry to verify the
information . .. , and whether the truth was easily accessible
151
In Weiner, the information for Alexander's book was obtained
mostly from personal interviews with individuals who knew Schreuder
well. "'52 In addition, the Appellate Division found Doubleday to have
"carefully reviewed the book before its publication."'" Doubleday was
in regular contact with Alexander and was actively involved in monitor-
ing and editing all statements believed "problematic from a legal stand-
point."' 54 Doubleday also allegedly sought and followed advice from
outside counsel specializing in libel, who suggested that Doubleday ob-
tain substantiation from Alexander for some of her material. 55
The backgrounds of both Alexander and her researcher, Alex
148. Id.
149. Id. at 601, 599. Compare Dalbec, 828 F.2d 921, where defendant publisher published a
"swinger's ad" containing a lewd description of plaintiff which wrongly suggested that she was
promiscuous. The ad, which was forged by a stranger, identified the plaintiff by her full
maiden name and the small town where she was born and still resided. "The magazine admit-
tedly did nothing to verify the statement." Id. at 925. In a later issue, the magazine called
plaintiff a "fraud," although it knew at that time that she was not responsible for placing the
ad. Id. at 927.
150. See Hawks, 109 A.D.2d 974, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
151. Id.
152. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 601. Alexander claims that in total, approximately 250 peo-
ple were interviewed. Id. at 599.
153. Id. at 601.
154. Id. quoting affidavit of James Moser, who edited Nutcracker as an employee of
Doubleday.
155. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
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Dubro, are significant as to Doubleday's reliance on them. A publisher's
"reliance upon the integrity of a reputable author bars, as a matter of
law, a finding of actionable fault against [it] under New York libel
law."156 Alexander had almost forty years' experience as an investigative
journalist and author when she began writing "Nutcracker."'117 Her re-
searcher, Alex Dubro, was also an experienced journalist whose resume
included work for the President's Commission on Organized Crime and
the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.'58
Under such circumstances, a book publisher can rely on its knowledge of
the good reputation of the author. 59 Doubleday was thus under no obli-
gation to re-research the material submitted by Alexander."6
In sum, in the absence of specific proof that Doubleday's reliance on
Alexander and Dubro's work was substantially improper, "the mere fact
that the published information might later be proven false" was insuffi-
cient to justify granting Weiner's motion for summary judgment. 16'
Therefore, even if one were to assume that the fourth reference to Weiner
in the book is a defamatory statement of fact, 162 under New York law,
the Appellate Division holding was correct because Doubleday did not
act in a grossly irresponsible manner.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the outcome in Weiner was correct under New York law,
the Appellate Division decision does little to create a clear, preventative
checklist for publishers to follow when they publish books like "Nut-
cracker." The ambiguity surrounding the law of defamation can be illus-
trated by the differing opinions in Weiner: The assessments of the case
by the trial court and the Appellate Division were so completely dispa-
rate that each granted summary judgment for the opposing parties.
163
Subjective balancing by courts of the competing interests in free speech
and reputation creates more ambiguity in defamation law, leaving pub-
lishers uncertain about whether they are leaving themselves open to a
156. Ortiz, 102 A.D.2d 513, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 898. In Ortiz, the author was considered to be
an experienced professional; his researcher was "a highly reliable and trustworthy source." Id.
at 897.
157. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
158. Id.
159. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 287.
160. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 602. See also Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 73-74,
155 Cal. Rptr. 29.
161. Ortiz, 102 A.D.2d 513, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
162. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
163. Weiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
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successful defamation suit. Finally, the unpredictable nature of court de-
cisions regarding the culpability of a publisher's conduct adds to the
doubt.
All this uncertainty leaves publishers in a vulnerable position. 164
Few cases have clearly outlined for publishers "predictable standards of
journalistic 'safe conduct.' ",165 One commentator has pointed out that
"[c]ase law gives little guidance as to preferable procedures for pre-publi-
cation review in book publishing .... No methods have been declared
'safe harbors' for establishing per se the exercise of due care .... 166 A
need exists for state courts to formulate general guidelines in this area.
The possibility that some publishers are refusing to release written works
out of fear of defamation liability must be avoided.
Beth Yule Brotz
164. The vulnerability for publishers is arguably increased when authors negotiate for pro-
tection from defamation suits as part of their contracts. During the last ten years, there has
been an increase in the number of publishers who include authors under their insurance poli-
cies to cover expenses incurred by authors in defamation litigation. Gail Appleson, "Authors
Get Coverage on Publishers' Insurance" 68 A.B.A.J. 904 (August, 1982).
165. B.SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY, supra note 33, at 286.
166. Id. at 51.
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